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University of Nebraska–Lincoln  
In “Teleological Dispositions,” Nick Kroll appeals to teleology to ac-
count for the way that dispositions seem to be directed toward their 
merely possible manifestations. He argues that his teleological account 
of dispositions (TAD) does a better job of making sense of this direct-
edness than rival approaches that appeal to conditional statements or 
physical intentionality. In this short critique, I argue that, without sat-
isfactory clarification of a number of issues, TAD does not adequately 
account for the directedness of dispositions. I focus on two aspects of 
TAD: the Activation Principle, and the proposed necessary and suffi-
cient conditions for being a dispositional property. 
It is common in the dispositions literature to say that a disposition 
has a trigger, also known as a stimulus, stimulus condition, or circum-
stance of manifestation.1 For example, a stimulus condition for fragil-
ity is said to be “being struck.” Insofar as a counterfactual conditional 
statement is true of an object in virtue of having a certain disposition, 
the antecedent of that conditional characterizes the stimulus condition 
for that disposition. For example, if the conditional “if it were struck, 
it would break” is true of the fragile glass in virtue of its being fragile, 
then “being struck” characterizes the stimulus for its fragility. As Kroll 
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1 Some dispute the claim that dispositions have stimuli. See Vetter, Barbara. “Dis-
positions without Conditions.” Mind 123 (2014): 129-56 and Mumford, Stephen 
and Rani L. Anjum, Getting Causes from Powers. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
(2011): 37. 
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points out, some philosophers analyze “the glass is fragile” in terms 
of a conditional such as “if the glass were struck, it would break.” 
Kroll effectively characterizes many of the reasons conditional anal-
yses have been on the defensive in recent years. Many philosophers 
have recognized numerous scenarios in which the truth values of the 
disposition ascription and that of counterfactual diverge.2 To take a 
simple example, the counterfactual “if it were struck, it would break” 
is not true of the fragile glass when it is wrapped in bubble wrap. At 
this point, of course, there are many moves available to defenders of 
the conditional approach,3 but I will not rehearse them here. Rather, 
I want to focus on Kroll’s alternative to conditional accounts of dispo-
sitions—his teleological account. I begin with a key principle of Kroll’s 
account, the Activation Principle: 
“(AV) If x’s disposition to M when C is activated, then either 
x immediately Ms or there is some process such that if 
the process were to continue without interruption, x 
would M.” 
On the face of it, this principle seems subject to the same kinds of 
counterexamples as conditional analyses. If the glass’s disposition to 
break when struck is activated by striking while it is wrapped in bub-
ble-wrap, the glass does not immediately break, and quite possibly, 
there is no process which is such that, if it were to continue without 
2 Numerous objectors to conditional analyses of disposition ascriptions in-
clude Vetter (op. cit.) as well as Smith, A. D. “Dispositional Properties.” 
Mind 86 (1977): 439-45; Martin, C. B. “Dispositions and Conditionals,” Phil-
osophical Quarterly 44 (1994): 1-8; Bird, Alexander. “Dispositions and Anti-
dotes,” The Philosophical Quarterly 48 (1998): 227-34; Molnar, George. “Are 
Dispositions Reducible?” Philosophical Quarterly 49 (1999): 1-17, 145-67; 
Clarke, Rudolph. “Intrinsic Finks,” The Philosophical Quarterly 58 (2008): 
512-18; Everett, Anthony. “Intrinsic Finks, Masks, and Mimics,” Erkenntnis 
71 (2009): 191-203; Schrenk, Markus. “Hic Rhodos, Hic Salta: From Reduc-
tionist Semantics to a Realist Ontology of Forceful Dispositions,” in Dam-
schen, Gregor, Robert Schnepf, and Karsten R Stüber, eds., Debating Dispo-
sitions: Issues in Metaphysics, Epistemology and Philosophy of Mind. Berlin: 
Walter de Gruyter, 2009. 
3 See Choi, Sungho. “The Simple vs. Reformed Conditional Analysis of Dispo-
sitions.” Synthese 148 (2006): 369-79; Gundersen, L. (2002). In Defence of 
the Conditional Account of Dispositions. Synthese, 130, 389-411. 
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interruption, the glass would break. However, Kroll claims that the 
activation principle is counterexample free. How could this be? Kroll 
claims that his account avoids such counterexamples by making a 
distinction between a disposition being “activated” and its stimulus 
condition obtaining. Accordingly, a disposed object can be subject to 
the stimulus condition for its disposition without that disposition 
being activated. In other words, the disposition can be “stimulated” 
without being “activated.” Kroll gives the following examples to illus-
trate stimulation without activation: a vase wrapped in bubble wrap 
is dropped, and is consequently subject to the stimulus condition for 
“the disposition to break when dropped,” but the disposition is not 
activated; a computer’s disposition to overheat is subject to the stim-
ulus condition—running a large number of processes—but the com-
puter’s disposition to overheat is not activated due to the computer’s 
cooling mechanisms. 
The distinction between “a disposed object being in stimulating 
circumstances” on the one hand, and “an object having its disposi-
tion activated” on the other, makes some intuitive sense. But I suspect 
that part of this intuitive appeal draws on the plausible distinction 
between the stimulus condition partially obtaining and the stimulus 
condition fully obtaining. Arguably, the stimulus condition for the 
disposition to break when struck does not fully obtain if something 
is dropped while wrapped in bubble wrap. If the distinction between 
partial and complete stimulus conditions is not the kind of distinc-
tion Kroll has in mind, then it must be that every aspect of the stim-
ulus condition could fully obtain, and yet the activation of the dis-
position does not occur. What, then, is this activation? What kind of 
thing is it? What are the grounds or truth-makers for “x’s disposition 
to M when C is activated”? 
Clearly, an activation is supposed to be something that happens at 
a time—prior to, or simultaneous with the disposition’s manifesta-
tion, as (AV) suggests. I assume that an activation happens in a place 
as well, somewhere in the vicinity of the disposed object. Since an ac-
tivation has a duration and a location, it seems like an event. But if 
the activation is an event, it is clearly supposed to be an event that is 
distinct from the stimulus event. So, consider a case where an unpro-
tected glass is struck and it breaks. If the striking started a process 
that continued without interruption, when and where did the activa-
tion happen? One possibility is that it happened at the same time and 
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place as the striking. If that is so, we need some criteria for event-
identity beyond spatio-temporal location to differentiate the stimu-
lus event from the activation. Perhaps these two supposedly different 
events involve instantiation of different properties. But what proper-
ties does an activation event have? Another possibility is that the ac-
tivation happens after the stimulus occurs. So, the striking happens, 
and then the disposition to break when struck is activated, initiating a 
process which continues uninterrupted until the glass breaks. And if it 
just so happens that the process never starts, that’s no problem for the 
account, because we can just say that, while stimulated, the disposi-
tion was never activated. And what’s the reason for thinking the dispo-
sition was not activated? Perhaps we should think that the activation 
did not occur because neither the manifestation, nor a process leading 
to the manifestation, occurred. It’s not dear if there could be any in-
dependent empirical evidence that an activation did or did not occur. 
What if the manifestation happened immediately upon the occur-
rence of the stimulus? Suppose the glass shatters instantaneously 
upon being struck. Then the activation must be simultaneous with 
both the striking and the breaking. If the activation is a third event 
happening at the same place and time, again it is hard to see any in-
dependent empirical evidence for its occurrence. Either an activation 
is a mysterious and ad hoc third event (in addition to the stimulus 
and the manifestation) or it is indistinguishable from the initial stage 
of the process leading to the manifestation, or it is indistinguishable 
from the manifestation itself If the activation is construed as either 
the manifestation, or as the initial stage of the process leading to the 
manifestation, then the account becomes circular and trivial. It would 
essentially say: 
If x’ s disposition to M when C is such that x immediately 
Ms or some process leading to x M-ing commences, then 
either x immediately Ms or there is some process such 
that, if the process were to continue without interrup-
tion, x would M. 
None of these options seem very attractive, so I assume Kroll will want 
to say something else about the nature of activation, or the truth-mak-
ers of activation claims. In doing so, perhaps he could address another 
concern about his stimulus/activation distinction. Clearly, on Kroll’s 
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view, the stimulus is not sufficient for the activation of the disposition. 
Nor is the stimulus sufficient for the manifestation, nor for any pro-
cess that would lead to the manifestation. However, the activation is 
sufficient for the manifestation, or it is sufficient for the commence-
ment of a process that would lead to the manifestation. Consequently, 
it seems like activation is where the action is at. So, then what is the 
role of the stimulus? Is it possible to activate a disposition without the 
stimulus occurring? If so, then the stimulating circumstance C seems 
irrelevant. Something that has “a disposition to M in C” may or may 
not M in C, but it must M (or commence a processes leading to M-
ing) when it is activated. Perhaps “the disposition to M in C” should 
be called “the disposition to M when activated.” Cases in which fragile 
glasses stay intact when struck would be irrelevant, since striking is 
merely a stimulus, and the thing that matters for manifesting is acti-
vation. This makes the questions about the nature of activation more 
pressing, because it seems like the only rationale for positing the idea 
that an activation occurred (or did not occur) is the occurrence (or 
nonoccurrence) of a manifestation (or a process leading to a manifes-
tation). Such a rationale for making claims about when activations oc-
cur makes the Activation Principle counterexample-free by fiat. 
An alternative to making the stimulus incidental to the manifesta-
tion process is to say that activation does not occur unless the stimu-
lus occurs that the stimulus is necessary for the activation. But what 
sort of necessity could this be? Perhaps the activation is grounded 
in the stimulus? But seeing as most accounts of grounding consider 
grounds to be sufficient for the grounded,4 this would have the con-
sequence that a stimulus is sufficient for an activation, contrary to 
Kroll’s account. Then perhaps the activation causally depends on the 
stimulus? In other words, perhaps the stimulus causes the activation. 
If this is right, it raises the question: 
 
 (1)  Why does a stimulus sometimes cause an activation, and 
sometimes not? 
Maybe sometimes a stimulus has all that it takes to cause an activation, 
and other times the stimulus lacks something. Note the similarities to 
4 Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality, ed. F. Correia 
and B. Schnieder. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. 
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the earlier discussion about partial and complete stimulus conditions. 
Also, note the similarity between question (1) and a question implic-
itly considered earlier with respect to conditional analyses: 
 
 (2)  Why does a stimulus sometimes cause a manifestation, and 
sometimes not? 
Kroll might answer question (2) by saying that, sometimes, stimulus 
causes an activation, and sometimes it doesn’t. But if there’s no an-
swer to question (1), then this answer to question (2) is unsatisfying. 
And answering question (1) would seem to require getting specific, 
or appealing to ideal conditions, or normal conditions, or any of the 
other moves that defenders of conditional analyses have tried—moves 
which Kroll criticizes. Another way to put the point is as follows. Ac-
cording to a simple account of the manifestation process, when a dis-
position is stimulated, it manifests. We noted a problematic mismatch 
between stimulated dispositions and manifesting dispositions. Kroll’s 
alternative offers a perfect match between activated dispositions and 
manifesting dispositions.5 Yet the account entails an unexplained mis-
match between stimulated dispositions and activated dispositions. So, 
the introduction of “activation” adds another element or step to the 
manifestation process, thereby relocating, but not solving, the prob-
lem with the simpler account. 
Kroll goes on to develop his Teleological Account of Dispositions 
(TAD) beyond the Activation Principle. Insofar as dispositions are di-
rected at their manifestations, a teleological directedness seems like a 
plausible way to go. However, the details of the account warrant clar-
ification. One of the key tenets of TAD states necessary and sufficient 
conditions for a property to be a disposition: 
“(T2) Necessarily: a property P is a disposition iff there is a con-
dition C and event-type M such that necessarily, P is the 
property of being in a state directed at the end that one 
Ms when C.” 
5 I am simplifying slightly. Kroll’s perfect match is between activated dispositions 
and manifestations (or interruptible processes leading to manifestations). 
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One implication of this analysis is that the existence of the stimulat-
ing condition is necessary for a property to be a disposition. It is im-
plausible to think that this means that a particular occurrence of the 
stimulus is necessary for the disposition to exist. So, it must mean 
that the stimulus-type is necessary for the disposition to exist. I am 
not sure what the existence conditions for stimulus-types are. Per-
haps, in order for a type of event to exist in a world, an instance of 
that type must occur in that world. That would have the implication 
that, say, in a world where immersion in water has never occurred, 
there is no such thing as water-solubility. Also, in the actual world, 
there would no dispositions to manifest in merely possible kinds of 
circumstances. 
This implication aside, my first question about (T2) is, what does 
Kroll mean by “a property of being in a state”? To answer that, one 
would have to say what a state is. Perhaps a state is a state of affairs, 
which some philosophers construe as a particular instantiating a prop-
erty.6 Then “a property of being in a state” would be “a property of 
being a particular instantiating a property,” and the account does not 
say what this further property is. If a disposition is a property of be-
ing a particular with a certain property, this suggests that a disposi-
tion is a second-order property—a property that a thing has in virtue 
of having some other property. This further suggests that a disposi-
tion must have some sort of basis, or grounds. This claim has been 
disputed by a number of dispositions theorists.7 
Whatever a state is, according to (T2), some states are directed 
at an end. So then a disposition is a property of being in a state, and 
this state is directed at an end. According to Kroll, it is the state that 
is directed at the end, not the disposition. So, despite being promised 
an account of a disposition’s directedness, what’s directed is not the 
disposition, but a state. Is the disposition indirectly directed at the 
end in virtue of being a property of a state that is directed at an end? 
6 See, for example, Armstrong, D. M. A World of States of Affairs. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1997. 
7 See, for example, McKitrick, Jennifer. “The Bare Metaphysical Possibility of Bare 
Dispositions.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (2003): 349-69; 
Mumford, Stephen. “The Ungrounded Argument.” Synthese 149 (2006): 471-89; 
Bird, Alexander. ‘’The Regress of Pure Powers?” The Philosophical Quarterly 57 
(2007): 513-34. 
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Then dispositions are at best indirectly directed, so to speak. Perhaps 
there’s nothing problematic here, but featuring “states” in this analy-
sis adds apparently unnecessary complications, since the motivation 
for doing so is unclear. 
My second line of questions about (T2) are about the end at which 
the state is directed—”that one Ms when C.” What does it mean to be 
directed at M-ing when C? Does it mean that, when C happens, one is 
directed at M-ing? Or, does it mean that one is directed at C happen-
ing so that one can M? Or does it mean that one is directed at both C 
happening and M-ing? For example, if the end of “the disposition to 
break when struck” is that one breaks when struck, does that mean 
that one aims at getting struck and consequently breaking? If so, then 
fragile things are, in part, directed at getting struck. It is implausi-
ble to think that disposed objects are in a state such that they are di-
rected towards triggering their dispositions, even in part. Perhaps, 
instead, one aims at breaking only when one is struck. This suggests 
that when one isn’t struck, one isn’t aiming at breaking. This would 
have the consequence that when dispositions aren’t in the stimulat-
ing circumstances, they are not directed at their manifestations. If so, 
then this analysis does not account for the directedness of dispositions 
when stimulating circumstances do not obtain. 
Furthermore, when Kroll writes that the state is directed at the 
end that “one Ms when C,” what is the referent of “one”? Anything? 
So, perhaps the state is directed at an existential fact that something 
Ms when C? We get some clarification in (T2.1), which is said to fol-
low from (T2): 
“(T2.1):  Necessarily: a property P is a disposition iff there is 
a condition C and event-type M such that: necessarily, 
x has P iff x is in a state directed at the end that x Ms 
when C.” 
So, the object that has the disposition is the “one” that Ms, if the end 
is realized. Since (T2) does not specify what thing Ms in the end, it 
is not clear how (T2.1) is supposed to follow from (T2). At any rate, 
it is questionable whether we should accept (T2.1), for it entails 
that the locus of manifestation is always the disposed object. Con-
sequently, it rules out the possibility that a thing can have a dispo-
sition for something else to M. But examples of such dispositions are 
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common: being lethal, poisonous, soporific, attractive, or provoca-
tive, for example. Perhaps Kroll would want to say that, in such cases 
the manifestation is causing death, causing poisoning, causing sleep, 
etc. and these are things that the disposed object does when its dis-
position is activated. But is “causing death” an event-type? It sounds 
like a causal process, and various kinds of causal processes can be 
causings of death. Furthermore, “M-ing when C” is supposed to be 
“the end.” If the end is “causing death,” the end at which the state 
is directed is itself a causal process, and not the end of that causal 
process. But if, instead, the manifestation is the end of that causal 
process—sleeping, dying, being angry, etc.—then the particular that 
is “M-ing” is not the particular that had the disposition in question, 
and (T2.1) should be rejected. 
Even if these questions about (T2.1) have satisfactory answers, 
there are further questions to consider about ends. Kroll approvingly 
quotes Makin: “a teleological process has a privileged stage to which it 
runs in normal conditions.” If the end is truly a privileged state, then 
not just any M-ing will do—only M-ing when C. So the characteriza-
tion of the stimulating circumstances matters. And M-ing is said to 
be one event-type. Typing events has its own challenges: does shat-
tering into thousands of shards, chipping, cracking, and splitting in 
two all count as instances of the event-type “breaking?” Regardless, a 
surprising consequence of this account is that it rules out multi-track 
dispositions. Multi-track dispositions manifest via different types of 
events in different types of circumstances.8 For example, courage can 
manifest by rushing into a burning building, or by standing up for an 
unpopular political position. One manifestation of electrical charge 
is attraction (in the stimulating circumstances of being in proximity 
to certain kinds of particles) and another manifestation of electrical 
charge is repulsion (in the stimulating circumstance of being in prox-
imity to other kinds of particles). Kroll could say that attraction and 
repulsion are really the same type of event, but then the criteria for 
event-typing looks suspiciously ad hoc. Kroll could side with Alexander 
Bird and say that charge is merely a cluster of different dispositions 
8 See Ryle, Gilbert. The Concept of Mind. New York: Barnes and Noble, 1949, for an 
introduction to the multi-track/single-track distinction. See Vetter, Barbara. Po-
tentiality: From Dispositions to Modality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, 
pp. 36-46, for arguments that all dispositions are massively multi-track. 
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with different manifestations.9 And Kroll could say that, while there 
are many different dispositions to do many different kinds of dan-
gerous or frightening things, there is no such thing as courage. Such 
costs follow from defining dispositions as exclusively “single-track.” 
Furthermore, recall that (T2.1) says that when x has a dispositional 
property to M in C, “ ... x is in a state directed at the end that x Ms 
when C.” So, consider a puddle of water. It has many dispositions: to 
freeze when cold, to evaporate when hot, to dissolve salt when salt is 
immersed in it, and many others. So, according to Kroll’s account, the 
puddle is in a state directed at the end that it freezes when cold, and it 
is in a state directed at the end that it evaporates when hot, and it is in 
a state directed at the end that it dissolves salt when salt is immersed 
in it. If each particular <stimulus-type, manifestation-type> pair cor-
responds to a different disposition, and we differentiate event-types 
in a relatively fine-grained way, this list is innumerably long. So, how 
many states is the puddle in? Is it just one state that is directed at all 
of these different ends? Then the puddle would be in one state simul-
taneously directed at innumerably many ends, most of which could 
not be jointly realized. If there is a different state for each stimulus-
manifestation pair, the puddle would simultaneously be in innumer-
ably many states, and simultaneously directed at innumerably many 
ends, most of which could not be jointly realized. And the simple pud-
dle would be no anomaly, in terms of its massively-multi-directedness. 
Summing up, the main reasons why TAD does not adequately ac-
count for a disposition’s directedness are the following. First, TAD de-
pends on the idea that dispositions lead to their manifestations when 
they are activated, but it is unclear what it means to say a disposition 
is activated as opposed to being stimulated. Second, TAD does not at-
tribute directedness to the disposition itself. Third, TAD does not ac-
count for directedness when the stimulating circumstances do not ob-
tain. Fourth, if TAD does give us directedness, it gives too much, for 
it seems to entail that everything is always directed in innumerably 
many different directions.    
9 Bird, Alexander. Nature’s Metaphysics: Laws and Properties. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2007, pp. 21-4. Vetter points out that this conflicts with our best 
scientific understanding of such properties (Potentiality: From Dispositions to 
Modality). 
 
